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INTRODUCTION
“As for nursing in the restroom—half the time I don’t even want
to use a public restroom for its intended purposes.” Helen,
Virginia 1
Until recently, Ohio mothers and their infants had something to cry
about due to the state’s lack of protection for women breastfeeding in
public. 2 However, a new law provides hope of protection after the state’s
legal battle with public breastfeeding. 3 A recent Sixth Circuit case
highlighted public breastfeeding as a legal issue and demonstrated that
Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, which protects women from sex discrimination,
lacks legal protection for mothers who breastfeed in public. 4 The court, in
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, concluded that Ohio storeowners and
managers of public businesses may restrict or even ban breastfeeding in
their stores, despite the state’s explicit prohibition against sex
discrimination in places of public accommodation. 5 In response, Ohio
followed a recent state trend and enacted legislation aimed at protecting
women who choose to breastfeed in public. 6 Without state protection,
breastfeeding discrimination may occur—which constitutes harassment of,
or refusal to provide public accommodations to, women who breastfeed in
public. 7
Ohio’s new law has been implemented in direct response to judicial
refusal to extend various existing sex discrimination frameworks to protect

1. See Editorial, Breast (and Worst) Case Scenarios, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at
A10 (recounting several reader responses to a Washington Post staff writer’s article on
breastfeeding).
2. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2004) (prohibiting discrimination
based on sex in places of public accommodation); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374
F.3d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Derungs] (holding that Ohio’s Public
Accommodation Statute (“OPAS”) does not prohibit storeowners or managers of places of
public accommodation from restricting or banning breastfeeding in their stores or
establishments).
3. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (requiring places of public
accommodation to allow mothers to breastfeed their children).
4. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (finding that OPAS does not prohibit a storeowner’s
ban on breastfeeding because such a restriction does not constitute discrimination based on
sex).
5. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting storeowners or employees
from denying full enjoyment or use of places of public accommodation on the basis of an
individual’s sex); see also Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that prohibitions on
breastfeeding do not amount to sex discrimination).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 1997) (protecting a woman’s right to
breastfeed her child in public); accord N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West 2004).
7. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (describing Wal-Mart’s prohibition of breastfeeding,
which required mothers, such as Ms. Derungs, to stop breastfeeding or leave the store).
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women who breastfeed in public from discrimination. 8 This new law will
better protect a woman’s choice to breastfeed in public. 9 Although this law
does not directly nullify the Derungs decision, it offers protection outside
of a sex discrimination or public accommodation framework for women
who do breastfeed in public. Derungs foreclosed the use of Ohio’s Public
Accommodation Statute (“OPAS”), part of the Ohio Civil Rights Act,
through its prohibition of sex discrimination, as an avenue to protect public
breastfeeding. 10 The new law, in part, corrects the judicial refusal to
protect public breastfeeding by giving mothers an affirmative right to
breastfeed in buildings of public accommodation. 11 While this law
demonstrates Ohio’s intent to correct the effect of the Derungs holding, it is
not entirely clear whether this law will be as effective in overruling
Derungs as legislation amending OPAS would have been. 12
Part I of this Comment examines breastfeeding as a legal issue under
both Ohio state law and federal law. 13 Part II of this Comment argues that,
until recently, Ohio law did not adequately protect mothers against
prohibitions or restrictions on breastfeeding due to the Sixth Circuit’s
narrow interpretation of OPAS’s prohibition of sex discrimination in
Derungs. 14 Part II also describes federal courts’ use of the Title VII
comparability analysis in employment cases and the extension of this
analysis to the public accommodation discrimination claim in Derungs. 15
Moreover, Part II discusses the Derungs ruling as a form of discrimination
against women. 16 Finally, this Comment advocates the need for more
8. See infra Part II (arguing that, as exemplified by Derungs, the prohibition of sex
discrimination under OPAS inadequately protects public breastfeeding, because courts have
ruled that discriminatory acts towards breastfeeding do not constitute sex discrimination).
9. See infra Part II.D (asserting that a woman’s choice to breastfeed is affected by her
ability to breastfeed in public); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (Ohio
2005) (giving mothers an affirmative right to breastfeed in places of public
accommodation).
10. See infra Part II.A (explaining that the Derungs court interpreted OPAS to exclude
discriminatory acts towards breastfeeding women from the definition of discrimination
based on sex).
11. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (allowing women to breastfeed
in public by requiring buildings of public accommodation to allow the act).
12. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (West 2005) (establishing the procedure
for filing a complaint of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission). OPAS,
unlike the newly amended building standards section of Ohio law, confers a private right of
action for victims of discrimination. Id.
13. See generally infra Part I (outlining the federal programs that promote public
breastfeeding, as well as discussing court treatment of breastfeeding discrimination claims,
OPAS and subsequent case law holding that OPAS does not prohibit restrictions or bans on
public breastfeeding).
14. See infra Part II.A (arguing that Derungs incorrectly foreclosed the possibility of
interpreting OPAS to protect public breastfeeding in Ohio).
15. See infra Part II.B (explaining that the comparability analysis is outdated and
ignores the fact that, like pregnancy, breastfeeding is sex-specific in nature).
16. See infra Part II.C (asserting that the logic behind pregnancy as a sex-specific
characteristic, which leads to classification of pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex
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states to follow Ohio’s steps and enact new laws that promote the legal
protection for public breastfeeding through alternative legislation. 17 This
Comment concludes that state legal frameworks that do not protect women
who breastfeed from discrimination are inconsistent with the federal policy
promoting breastfeeding and, therefore, alternative legislation protecting
the practice is critical to gain consistency with these policies. 18
I. BACKGROUND
Breastfeeding provides countless health and social benefits for infants,
mothers, and society. 19 Federal policy even promotes breastfeeding and
recognizes its many benefits. 20 Women have a constitutional right to
decide to breastfeed their children. 21 Many state criminal statutes exclude
exposure of the female breast while breastfeeding from indecency statutes
and most states protect a woman’s right to breastfeed publicly. 22 However,
until earlier this year, the state of Ohio had failed to adopt any such law or
policy to protect and promote breastfeeding. 23 Ohio’s new law is an
attempt to align Ohio law with the laws of other states that explicitly

discrimination, also applies to breastfeeding).
17. See infra Part II.D (proposing that the importance of promoting breastfeeding and
the lack of protection in the existing sex discrimination frameworks necessitate legislative
alternatives to protect against breastfeeding discrimination).
18. See infra Conclusion (arguing that Derungs exemplifies the need for express
legislation protecting breastfeeding); see also infra Part I.C (highlighting a number of
federal programs promoting breastfeeding including, for example, the Special Supplemental
Program for Women, Infants, and Children).
19. See OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION ON BREASTFEEDING 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT]
(enumerating the benefits of breastfeeding, including enhancing children’s resistance to
infection, reducing the risk of certain cancers for breastfeeding mothers and decreasing
family medical costs).
20. See, e.g., MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, HEALTH RESOURCES SERVS. ADMIN.,
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. [hereinafter CHILD HEALTH BUREAU] (describing the
role of the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, which includes providing training and
publications for local and state authorities to promote breastfeeding), at
http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/compend-MCHB.htm (last visited July 24, 2005).
21. See Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County, 650 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. Unit B July
1981) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit protection of certain privacy
interests includes a woman’s decision to breastfeed).
22. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(b) (Michie 2004) (excluding breastfeeding
from the definitions of “lewd conduct,” “lewd touching,” “immoral conduct” and “indecent
conduct”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.03 (West 2004) (exempting a breastfeeding mother from
an indecent exposure statute); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9(a)(2) (West 2004) (stating
that breastfeeding does not constitute public indecency); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01
(McKinney 1983) (amended 1984) (excluding exposure of the breast during breastfeeding
from the criminal indecent exposure statute).
23. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that banning or restricting breastfeeding in
places of public accommodation does not violate Ohio's anti-discrimination law). But see
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (amending the building standards code to
require places of public accommodation to allow mothers to breastfeed their children in
those places).
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protect the act of breastfeeding in public. 24
A. Ohio’s Battle with Legal Protection for Public Breastfeeding
1. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores
Three women tested the scope of legal protection for public
breastfeeding under OPAS by filing a complaint against Wal-Mart in Ohio
state court, alleging that Wal-Mart’s restrictions on breastfeeding violated
OPAS as discrimination on the basis of age and sex. 25 After Wal-Mart
removed the action to federal court, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Wal-Mart for the sex and age discrimination claims. 26
The women then appealed to the Sixth Circuit for review of the sex
discrimination claim exclusively. 27 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s judgment, finding that while Ohio courts should construe civil
rights statutes liberally, 28 OPAS does not prohibit restrictions on public
breastfeeding as a form of discrimination based on sex. 29
The Sixth Circuit first looked to the intent of the Ohio Legislature in
enacting OPAS and concluded that the legislature intended to limit the
inclusion of claims of pregnancy discrimination as a basis for sex
discrimination to claims of employment discrimination.30 The court also
24. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (permitting mothers to breastfeed
their children in public); accord CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:4B-4 (West 2004).
25. See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 861, 863-65 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (explaining that Dana Derungs and two other women were nursing in Ohio Wal-Mart
stores when employees asked them either to nurse in the restroom or leave the store). The
women claimed that the store discriminated against them because of their sex because only
women can breastfeed. Id., aff’d, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004).
26. See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 894 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(holding that restrictions on breastfeeding do not constitute discrimination based on sex or
age under OPAS).
27. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 431 n.1 (noting that the plaintiffs waived appeal for
failure to brief their tort claims and that they affirmatively waived their age discrimination
claim).
28. See id. at 433 (stating that both the Ohio state legislature and the Ohio Supreme
Court support the notion that Ohio courts should construe civil rights statutes liberally); see
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (West 2004) (explaining that Ohio courts must
construe all provisions under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, including OPAS, liberally); Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d. 3, 6 (Ohio 1974) (constructing the definition of
a place of public accommodation under OPAS liberally to comply with the congressional
purpose behind its enactment).
29. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 436-37 (finding that the language and legislative history
of the statute point to a definition of discrimination on the basis of sex that does not include
breastfeeding discrimination).
30. See id. at 436 (reasoning that, because the legislature amended sections (A)—(F) of
Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, but not section (G) to adopt the language of the PDA, the
legislature only intended to include pregnancy discrimination in the definition of sex
discrimination in those amended provisions); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4112.02(A)-(H) (noting that sections (A)-(F) prohibit employers from discrimination on the
basis of sex, while section (H) pertains not to employers, but owners of places of public
accommodation).
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looked to federal employment law in its analysis. 31 The court explained
that, while Congress meant to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (“PDA”), the court may still employ the comparability analysis set
forth in Gilbert. 32 In following this analysis, courts compare women to
men in similar circumstances to decide a valid claim of discrimination
based on sex. Federal courts and state courts following a federal sex
discrimination framework employ this analysis, resulting in the exclusion
of breastfeeding from protections for sex discrimination claims. 33
2. Ohio’s Public Accommodation Statute
OPAS, like Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act, provides that “[i]t
shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice” for:
[A]ny proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager of a place of
public accommodation to deny to any person, except for reasons
applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of
public accommodation. 34

31. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (explaining that Ohio courts use the Title VII analysis
to interpret the Ohio Civil Rights Act).
32. See id. at 435 (reasoning that since the Ohio Legislature passed OPAS before the
Supreme Court overruled Gilbert, the reasoning of Gilbert applied to OPAS); see also Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-30 (1976) (holding that General Electric’s disability
plan did not violate Title VII, even though it excluded coverage for pregnancy related
medical costs for the spouses of male employees, because there was no benefit the plan
provided for men that it did not provide for women).
33. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430, 438 (invoking the Gilbert comparability
analysis and finding that OPAS does not protect women from discrimination based on
breastfeeding).
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G); see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000a (2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin in
places of public accommodation); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (A)(9)
(including a restaurant, a barbershop, a public store or place of amusement as examples of
places of public accommodation).
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The statute is part of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, which also prohibits
employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, property owners and
housing financers from discriminatory practices. 35 The Ohio Legislature
amended a number of sections of the Civil Rights Act to include the
language of the PDA in 1980. 36
The Ohio Supreme Court only had the opportunity to interpret OPAS
once, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyj, and found that the owner
of a trailer park violated the rights of a white resident under the statute. 37
Importantly, however, the court decided Lysyj when OPAS only prohibited
discrimination for reasons of race, color, religion, national origin and
ancestry. 38 A lower Ohio court later addressed OPAS in Meyers v. Hot
Bagels, after the legislature amended the statute to include sex, rejecting a
claim of sex discrimination. 39
3. Ohio’s New Breastfeeding Law
In 1994, the Ohio Legislature considered public breastfeeding as a legal
issue for the first time. 40 The legislature, however, failed to enact the
amendment, which would have protected a woman’s right to breastfeed in
public. 41 Several years later, in 1999, Representative Dixie J. Allen
proposed a bill to amend Ohio’s criminal code to protect public
breastfeeding. 42 However, that bill died in the House Criminal Justice
35. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.02(A)-(F),(H) (prohibiting discrimination
by using the terms “because of” or “on the basis of” race, sex, religion and other categories),
with id. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination “except for reasons applicable alike to all
persons regardless of” sex).
36. See id. § 4112.01(B) (stating that sections (A) through (F) of the Act are amended
to reflect that the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” should include “because
of or on the basis of pregnancy . . . .”).
37. See 313 N.E.2d at 1, 6 (holding that an owner of a trailer park denied a white
woman full enjoyment of the accommodations of the park because she was entertaining
black guests).
38. Compare id. at 5 (explaining that OPAS, as of 1974, only prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin and ancestry), with OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, national
origin, disability, age, ancestry and sex).
39. See Meyers v. Hot Bagels Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1082-83 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999) (denying a woman’s claim that a storeowner’s harassment, which was also directed at
male employees and customers, violated OPAS as sex discrimination). The court reasoned
that the appropriate test for discrimination is simply whether the denial of enjoyment is
applicable to all persons. Id.
40. See S.B. 342, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1993-1994) (proposing to
amend the Ohio code to protect a woman’s right to breastfeed in public); see also Mother
and Child: Suitable for Art, But Not Museum Exhibits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17,
1994, at A2 (reporting that the Ohio Legislature considered an amendment to protect public
breastfeeding following a Toledo museum’s negative response to a breastfeeding mother).
41. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (prohibiting only discrimination in places of
public accommodation based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability and
age).
42. See H.B. 328, 123d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999) (proposing to give women
an affirmative right to breastfeed in any public or private place, and to exclude exposure of
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committee without ever receiving a hearing. 43
In August 2004, one month after the Derungs decision, Representative
Patricia Clancy responded to the holding’s effect by sponsoring a bill
proposing not to amend OPAS, but instead to amend the code’s section on
building standards to allow women to breastfeed in public. 44 The bill
passed in the House Committee on Health, but the General Assembly
adjourned before the bill could reach the Senate. 45 At that time, media
opinion about the likely success of the bill was relatively negative. 46
Representative Clancy subsequently won a seat on the Ohio State Senate
and reintroduced the proposal during the 126th General Assembly. 47 The
proposed legislation was similar to laws in other states, which protect
public breastfeeding by giving mothers an affirmative right to breastfeed in
public. 48 However, the law’s sponsor has taken a more conservative
approach than other states, evidenced by the statute’s position in the
building standards code rather than in OPAS or another provision of the
Civil Rights Act. 49
The law passed unanimously in the Senate and passed the House with

the breast during breastfeeding from the definition of “nudity” under sex offense laws).
43. See E-mail from Lakeisha Hilton, Aide to Rep. Dixie J. Allen, Ohio House of
Representatives, to Brianne Whelan (Jan. 26, 2005, 09:12 EST) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Hilton E-mail] (stating that the bill never received a hearing in the Criminal
Justice committee and ultimately expired at the end of the legislative session).
44. See H.B. 554, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004) (proposing to enact
Section 3781.55 of the code, which governs building standards, so that a “mother is entitled
to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the
mother otherwise is permitted”).
45. See Hilton E-mail, supra note 43 (stating that the bill never became law despite it
passing through the committee hearing with only one opposition vote).
46. See, e.g., Laura A. Bischoff, Breastfeeding Bill Introduced in Ohio House, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2004, at 4B (stating that even the bill’s sponsor was not very
optimistic about the likelihood of passage, given the fact that it was introduced so close to
the end of the legislative session). But see Telephone Interview with Erika Cybulskis, Aide
to Ohio State Sen. Patricia Clancy (Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Cybulskis Interview] (stating
that the media’s pessimism was likely based on opinions of those involved with the
breastfeeding debate in Ohio for many years who experienced opposition in previous
attempts to promote the issue). For example, one woman who testified during a hearing for
the 1999 bill recalled how a male legislator harassed her after her testimony. Id.
47. See S.B. 41, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (demonstrating Senator
Clancy’s proposed legislation to protect breastfeeding mothers); see also Cybulskis
Interview, supra note 46 (stating that Senator Clancy planned to introduce the bill on
February 1, 2005 with the anticipated support of a large number of senators).
48. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (Ohio 2005) (stating that “[a] mother is
entitled to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein
the mother otherwise is permitted”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West 2004) (providing
that “a mother shall be entitled to breast feed her baby in any location of a place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement wherein the mother is otherwise permitted”).
49. See Cybulskis Interview, supra note 46 (stating that Senator Clancy considered
proposing an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, but anticipated a greater likelihood of
opposition from legislators who believe that breastfeeding does not rise to the same level of
discrimination as race or sex discrimination).
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only five opposition votes. 50 In the House, one representative offered an
amendment that would strike the word “entitled” from the text of the law. 51
This proposal was likely a result of fear that breastfeeding would be
equated with other civil rights such as freedom from race discrimination.
Even the bill’s sponsor shared this concern and declined to propose the bill
as an amendment to the civil rights statute, but instead to the building
standards code. 52 However, a majority of members opposed the proposed
amendment and the law was passed as originally introduced. 53 The law is
effective after September 16, 2005. 54
4. Exclusion of Breastfeeding from State Criminal Statutes
In addition to enacting a new law permitting women to breastfeed in
public, other state legislators should be aware that criminal laws present
other potential barriers to public breastfeeding. 55 States have recently
begun to exclude breastfeeding from statutes that criminalize indecent
exposure. 56 The Ohio Court of Appeals, for example, interpreted Ohio’s
indecent exposure statute as excluding exposure of the female breast from
criminal liability, effectively excluding breastfeeding in public from
However, as the previous lack of
possible punishable offenses. 57
protection in Ohio demonstrated, a change in criminal liability alone does
not necessarily lead to the legal protection of public breastfeeding. 58
50. See E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, Legislative Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio
Senate, to Brianne Whelan (May 12, 2005, 02:21 EST) (on file with author) (reporting that
Senate Bill 41 passed the Senate by a vote of 32-0); E-mail from Erika Cybulskis,
Legislative Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio Senate, to Brianne Whelan (May 18,
2005, 04:45 EST) (on file with author) (indicating that Senate Bill 41 passed the House by a
vote of 92-5).
51. See E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, Legislative Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio
Senate, to Brianne Whelan (May 19, 2005, 01:27 EST) (on file with author) (stating that
Representative Diana Fessler proposed that the language instead read that promoting
breastfeeding is part of the state's “strong public policy”).
52. See Cybulskis Interview, supra note 46 (stating that the bill’s sponsor decided on a
more conservative approach than proposing to amend the civil rights statute, an approach
that had failed in pass legislatures).
53. See id. (stating that the amendment was quashed after a vote of 52-45 in favor of
opposition).
54. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005).
55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1402 (West 2004) (criminalizing exposure of
the areola or nipple of the female breast as a sexual offense); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 764
(2004) (classifying exposure of the female breast as a sexual offense misdemeanor).
56. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (excluding breastfeeding from an indecent
exposure statute that prohibits exposure of the female breast).
57. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.09 (defining exposure of a “private part” as a
misdemeanor); State v. Jetter, 599 N.E.2d 733, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam)
(finding that the Ohio public indecency statute does not consider the female breast a “private
part”).
58. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that a public store’s policy banning
breastfeeding and allowing employees to ask breastfeeding mothers to leave or go to the
bathroom did not violate Ohio law); Jetter, 599 N.E.2d at 733 (holding that exposure of the
female breast does not qualify as a criminal indecency misdemeanor in Ohio).
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B. Federal Framework for Examining Breastfeeding Discrimination
Claims
1. General Electric Company v. Gilbert and Comparability Analysis
States that do not expressly protect breastfeeding but do protect women
from sex discrimination may not be adequately protecting breastfeeding as
demonstrated by the court’s decision in Derungs. 59 The court used an
employment discrimination analysis to examine whether restrictions on
breastfeeding amounted to discrimination based on sex. 60 Before the PDA,
the United States Supreme Court effectively excluded distinctions based on
pregnancy from claims of employment discrimination based on sex by
examining the subgroups that resulted from the challenged practice’s
division. 61 In General Electric Company v. Gilbert and Geduldig v. Aiello,
the Court defined the comparable groups created by an employer’s
disability plan as pregnant women and non-pregnant persons, and thus
foreclosed the possibility of analyzing the issue as a form of employment
discrimination based on sex. 62
The Supreme Court, in deciding Gilbert in 1976, considered whether
differential treatment of pregnant women was a form of sex-based
discrimination protected by Title VII. 63 The Court analyzed this question
using a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection test. 64 The Court held
that pregnancy discrimination, in the form of exclusion of pregnancy from
an employer’s disability plan, did not amount to a type of sex
discrimination because pregnancy does not fall under the traditional notion
of sex discrimination. 65
59. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that breastfeeding is not covered by the
PDA).
60. See id. at 437-38 (holding that Ohio courts apply the federal Title VII comparability
analysis in cases challenging the public accommodation statute).
61. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495-97 (1974) (holding that distinctions
based on pregnancy do not constitute sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40 (holding that as in
Geduldig, distinctions based on pregnancy do not constitute sex-based discrimination).
62. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-39 (defining pregnancy as a “risk” unique to women
and asserting that because the plan does not protect any risk for men that is not protected for
women, that distinction cannot be drawn by sex); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (asserting
that the second subgroup, non-pregnant persons, obviously has both female and male
members, so that distinction necessarily cannot be drawn by sex).
63. See 429 U.S. at 127-30 (assessing whether General Electric’s exclusion of
pregnancy from its disability benefits plan violated Title VII’s ban on sex-based
discrimination).
64. See id. at 133-36 (upholding General Electric’s disability benefits plan, which
excluded disabilities resulting from pregnancy, such as miscarriage or the disabling sixweek to eight-week period during a normal pregnancy). The Supreme Court reasoned that
distinctions based on pregnancy are not really sex-based distinctions, but instead distinctions
between pregnant and non-pregnant persons. Id. at 135.
65. See id. at 145 (stating that the traditional notion of sex discrimination compares
treatment of men to treatment of women in similar circumstances, and that the Court should
not infer that Congress sought to broaden this traditional concept of sex discrimination to
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In Derungs, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s use of Title
VII’s comparability analysis, which required the court to compare the
plaintiff with similarly situated members of the opposite sex to determine
whether the challenged practice is discriminatory. 66 The court, employing
this analysis, found Wal-Mart’s restrictions valid because the restrictions
did not treat women differently than men; the policy did not permit either
sex to feed their children in Wal-Mart stores. 67 States that follow a federal
sex discrimination framework will employ this type of analysis; therefore,
sex discrimination statues in these states will not protect public
breastfeeding.
The Derungs court also addressed the necessity of comparability analysis
in sex-plus discrimination claims, where the plaintiff alleges that the
discrimination stems from her sex in addition to some sex-neutral factor. 68
The Sixth Circuit held that sex-plus discrimination also required
comparison to a class of similarly situated males possessing the same sexneutral characteristic in order to prove discrimination based on a woman’s
sex. 69
2. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Two years after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gilbert, Congress passed
the PDA, which amended Title VII and broadened the meaning of sex
discrimination in employment by prohibiting discrimination against
pregnant women. 70 Congress followed the logic of Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Gilbert, finding that distinctions based on pregnancy were indeed
distinctions based on sex. 71 Congress sought to ensure that pregnancy
include pregnancy).
66. See Derungs, 374 F.3d. at 437 (requiring that the court define a comparable class of
people to compare with the plaintiffs in order to prove discrimination). The Sixth Circuit
found that there was no differential treatment between the sexes and therefore no valid claim
of sex-based discrimination. Id. at 439.
67. See id. at 437 (stating that feeding infants breast milk is not sex-specific so that
Wal-Mart’s restriction does not treat females differently than males); Derungs, 141 F. Supp.
2d at 890 (explaining that Wal-Mart’s restriction applied to two groups: (1) women who
breastfeed; and (2) individuals who do not breastfeed, and because the second group
included members of both sexes, the distinction was not discriminatory).
68. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 n.8 (defining sex-plus discrimination as occurring
“when a person is subjected to disparate treatment based not only on her sex, but on her sex
considered in conjunction with a second characteristic”); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (examining whether an individual's sex in addition to a sexneutral characteristic constituted sex discrimination under Title VII). In Phillips, the sexneutral characteristic was that the plaintiff had preschool-age children. Id.
69. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438-39 (asserting that there was no class of similarly
situated breastfeeding men).
70. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (defining
the Title VII’s terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” to include pregnancy).
71. See id.; see also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
because the capacity to become pregnant differentiates men from women, the disability plan
that did not cover pregnancy benefits discriminated based on sex).
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discrimination was a per se violation of Title VII. 72 Thus, courts would not
have to apply a Title VII comparability or “impact approach,” but instead
could conclude that pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII per se as a
type of discrimination based on sex. 73 In 1983, in Newport News v. EEOC,
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended to overrule Gilbert
with the passage of the PDA. 74 The Court in Newport News made it clear
that a facial distinction between men and women based on pregnancy, at
least in an employer’s insurance plan, constituted discrimination based on
sex. 75
C. Federal Promotion of Breastfeeding
Through the creation of a number of agencies and initiatives, the federal
government recognized the value of breastfeeding and extended education,
counseling, and support to promote the practice. 76 In 1975, Congress
established the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (“WIC”) as a permanent program to provide nutrition
counseling and other social services to low-income pregnant and
breastfeeding women. 77 In 1984, the Office of the Surgeon General held
its first workshop on breastfeeding. 78
72. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751
(stating that making such discrimination a per se violation of Title VII would eliminate the
need to rely on impact analysis because pregnancy discrimination is not, by itself, sex
discrimination).
73. See id. (stating that the “impact approach,” similar to, yet distinct from the the
comparability analysis, left employers and employees to speculate as to which distinctions
based on pregnancy would violate Title VII); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.
136, 141-42 (1977) (employing an “impact approach” as an alternative to the traditional
Title VII analysis). The “impact approach” examines whether the alleged discriminatory
practice burdens one sex over the other. Id. The Court held that a policy that deprived
women who take maternity leave of seniority constituted sex discrimination because the
policy had a disparate impact on women. Id. at 142.
74. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676, 678
(1983) (citing the plain language of the PDA, as well as House and Senate Committee
reports, to infer that Congress intended to include pregnancy as a basis for discrimination
“because of sex” or “on the basis of sex”).
75. See id. at 683-84 (invalidating an employer’s insurance program that differentiated
hospitalization coverage for spouses of male employees and female employees).
76. See, e.g., CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, supra note 20 (stating that the Department of
Health and Human Services established the Children’s Bureau in 1912 as part of a
commitment to improving the health of mothers and children).
77. See FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LEGIS. HISTORY OF
BREASTFEEDING PROMOTION REQUIREMENTS IN WIC, [hereinafter LEGIS. HISTORY]
(describing a number of services provided under the WIC initiative, including providing
breastpumps), at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/Breastfeeding/ bflegishistory.htm (last visited
July 24, 2005).
78. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN.’S
WORKSHOP ON BREASTFEEDING & HUMAN LACTATION, No. HRS-D-MC 84-2, 78-79 (1984)
(stating that initiatives stressed at the workshop included: strengthening of support of
breastfeeding in the health care system, improvements in professional education, public
education and promotion of breastfeeding, development of community support services,
initiation of a national promotion effort directed to working women and expanding research
on breastfeeding).
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In 1992, Congress officially recognized the importance of encouraging
breastfeeding by amending the Child Nutrition Act to include a national
breastfeeding promotion program. 79 This program authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to distribute materials and funds to promote breastfeeding as
an acceptable and desirable practice. 80 The Department of Health and
Human Services also promotes breastfeeding through its oversight of the
Maternal and Child Health Bureau. 81
D. State Laws and Statistics on Breastfeeding
In 2003, a Center for Disease Control survey revealed that about 64.5
percent of children in Ohio were breastfed at some point during infancy. 82
Ohio was one of a number of states that performed significantly lower than
the Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People 2010
objective, which was seventy-five percent of mothers breastfeeding
children at some point during infancy. 83 Some states, like California,
which legally protects public breastfeeding, exceeded this objective. 84 In
order to reach the desirable objectives set by the Department of Health and
Human Services, more states should follow Ohio’s recent legislative
response to lacking protection for public breastfeeding. 85

79. See Child Nutrition Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-342, 106 Stat. 911
(1992) (recognizing that breastfeeding is the best method for healthy infant nutrition); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 102-645, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 755, 757
(recognizing that the lack of support for breastfeeding is a major barrier to promoting the
practice). The promotion of breastfeeding is necessary because of the physical and
emotional benefits of breastfeeding, which include the protection of infants from ear
infections, diarrhea and respiratory illness. Id.
80. See LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 77 (stating that federal, state and local entities
should carry out the program’s goals of fostering acceptance of all breastfeeding).
81. See CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, supra note 20 (stating that Title V of the Social
Security Act authorizes the Bureau to promote breastfeeding through training, publications
and participation in the United States Breastfeeding Committee).
82. See NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2003 NAT’L IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, TABLE 2: GEOGRAPHICSPECIFIC BREASTFEEDING RATES [hereinafter IMMUNIZATION SURVEY] (reporting the
percentage of U.S. children breastfed in each state as a part of a nationwide survey using
telephone and follow-up mail surveys), at http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/NIS_data/
state.htm (last visited July 24, 2005).
83. See id. (reporting that Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Oklahoma, Indiana and
Kentucky had percentages ranging from 56.5 percent to 64.5 percent, and Louisiana had the
lowest rate of 46.4 percent).
84. See id. (reporting that 83.7 percent of mothers in California breastfed their infants at
some point during the first six months of infancy); see also CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West
1997) (protecting a mother’s right to breastfeed her child in any private or public location).
85. Compare CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 1997) (giving mothers a right to breastfeed
her child) and IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that 83.4 percent or mothers
breastfeed), with Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that OPAS does not protect public
breastfeeding) and IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that only 64.5 percent
mothers breastfeed in Ohio).
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II. ANALYSIS
The Derungs decision foreclosed the possibility of interpreting OPAS to
protect a woman’s right to breastfeed in public in Ohio. 86 While Ohio’s
new law protects public breastfeeding to a certain extent, it is important for
states that lack such legislation to take note of the Derungs decision, as it
another example of narrow judicial interpretation of the PDA. 87 The Sixth
Circuit’s analysis relied on the overruled logic of Gilbert, following a trend
of resurrecting the pre-PDA analysis in breastfeeding discrimination
claims. 88 As courts continue to ignore the sex-specific nature of
breastfeeding and refuse to extend the logic of the PDA to breastfeeding
claims, states that do not expressly protect breastfeeding will not
adequately protect discrimination against breastfeeding women even if they
prohibit sex discrimination. 89
A. Ohio’s New Law Combats the Lack of Legal Protection for
Breastfeeding under Civil Rights Sex Discrimination Law
Ohio’s new law responded to the effect of the Derungs holding by
expressly permitting women to breastfeed in buildings of public
accommodation. 90 Until recently, Ohio state law did not adequately
prohibit breastfeeding discrimination. 91 While Ohio’s Civil Rights statute,
specifically OPAS, includes sex as a ground for discrimination, the Sixth
Circuit interpreted “sex” as excluding breastfeeding. 92 The Supreme Court
86. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that OPAS does not prohibit stores from
restricting or banning breastfeeding because such prohibition does not constitute sex
discrimination under the statute).
87. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (permitting mothers to breastfeed
in buildings of public accommodation); Derungs, 374 F.4d at 430 (holding that claims of
breastfeeding discrimination are not actionable under the PDA).
88. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 (following federal cases involving breastfeeding
discrimination claims that employed a Gilbert comparability analysis); see also, e.g.,
Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (mem.) (invoking
Gilbert as the appropriate analysis and holding that an employer’s failure to protect a
woman’s ability to pump breast milk in private did not violate Title VII’s prohibition of sex
discrimination).
89. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430, 439 (stating that although the act requires distinctly
female characteristics, restrictions on breastfeeding do not constitute sex discrimination and
are therefore not protected under the accommodation statute in Ohio).
90. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (amending the civil code’s
building standards section to allow women to breastfeed in places of public
accommodation).
91. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that OPAS does not prohibit regulation of
breastfeeding as a form of sex discrimination). Therefore, the court found that Wal-Mart’s
policy, which instructed employees to ask breastfeeding women to leave its stores, was not
discriminatory under Ohio law. Id.
92. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting owners or managers of places
of public accommodation from denying full enjoyment of accommodations for reason of
sex); see also Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437, 439 (holding that prohibiting public breastfeeding
is not a form of sex discrimination because restrictions on breastfeeding do not treat one sex
differently than the other).
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has not considered this issue, but a number of federal courts agree that
restricting or prohibiting breastfeeding is not a form of sex
discrimination. 93 These cases, relying on the outdated logic of the Gilbert
decision, refused to extend Congress’s intent to establish pregnancy as sex
discrimination to breastfeeding. 94 Ohio’s new law, although conservative,
is a crucial step in protecting women who breastfeed in public. 95 The lack
of protection after Derungs and before Ohio’s new law demonstrates the
need for states to adopt express legislation protecting breastfeeding because
of the possibility of courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of sex
discrimination statutes.
Although not specifically addressing breastfeeding, Congress responded
to the dilemma that the sex-specific characteristic of pregnancy does not fit
into the traditional Title VII analysis, which requires a comparison between
men and women, and established pregnancy as a per se basis for
discrimination. 96 Courts have ignored that a plausible and logical
extension of Congress’s per se ban on pregnancy discrimination as a form
of sex discrimination is to include breastfeeding discrimination as a form of
sex discrimination. 97
Ohio’s new law, which expressly confers on women an affirmative right
to breastfeed in places of public accommodation, will at least partially
correct judicial refusal to extend the logic of protecting pregnancy under
prohibitions of sex discrimination to breastfeeding. 98 In enacting a law that
clearly and expressly protects public breastfeeding, Ohio is following a
growing majority of states recognizing this judicially-created sex
discrimination loophole. 99 These states legislated around the breastfeeding
93. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869-70 (W.D. Ky. 1990)
(holding that the PDA does not protect the act of breastfeeding); Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at
310-11 (finding that banning the activity of breast pumping does not rise to the level of sex
discrimination).
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2-3 (arguing that Justice Stevens accurately interpreted
pregnancy as a basis for sex discrimination in his Gilbert dissent).
95. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (giving women an affirmative
right to breastfeed in places of public accommodation).
96. See id. at 3 (stating that distinctions based on the ability to become pregnant
naturally constitute per se violations of Title VII).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (prohibiting sex discrimination based on pregnancy and
other related medical conditions); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (stating that the PDA
is deliberately broad in order to cover all aspects of the childbearing process).
98. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (Ohio 2005) (prohibiting
managers and owners of places of public accommodation from restricting or banning public
breastfeeding).
99. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 2004) (protecting a mother’s right to breastfeed
her infant in any place of public accommodation or any other place where the mother has a
right to be); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 310 (1997) (permitting mothers to breastfeed
any place they are permitted to be); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-21 (2004) (prohibiting
discrimination against breastfeeding mothers in places of public accommodation); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (guaranteeing mothers the right to breastfeed in places of public
accommodation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2004) (allowing mothers to breastfeed in
places of public accommodation); see also DARLEEN CHIEN, UNITED STATES BREASTFEEDING
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discrimination loophole by using public accommodation statutes. 100 Cases
like Derungs have made it clear that courts render more traditional avenues
of protection, namely employment and public accommodation
discrimination claims, useless in protecting public breastfeeding by
narrowly interpreting sex as a basis for such discrimination. 101 Therefore,
enacting express legislation permitting women to breastfeed in public is
necessary to protect women from breastfeeding discrimination. 102
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Analysis of Ohio’s Public Accommodation Statute:
Overruled, Outdated and Out of Place Logic
1. The Derungs Court Relied on Unsettled and Distinguishable Authority
The Derungs holding is crucial because it demonstrates that Title VII
does not protect a woman’s right to breastfeed and that state public
accommodation statutes that employ the language and framework of Title
VII will not adequately protect public breastfeeding. 103 In Derungs, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a Title VII comparability
analysis was appropriate to examine the discrimination claim under OPAS,
despite the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has never ruled on this
issue. 104 The court correctly relied on existing precedent, 105 but failed to
address the possible controversy in applying the comparability analysis. 106
The Sixth Circuit expressly noted that Ohio courts have not fully adopted
the application of federal Title VII analysis in public accommodation
claims; however, the court adopted an analysis that the PDA effectively

COMMITTEE, STATE LEGIS. THAT PROTECTS, PROMOTES, AND SUPPORTS BREASTFEEDING
(May 25, 2004) [hereinafter STATE LEGIS.] (reporting that currently thirty-six states have
legislation protecting or promoting breastfeeding).
100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 310 (adding an express statute protecting a
mother’s right to breastfeed in any place of public accommodation); id. tit. 6, § 4501
(prohibiting sex discrimination in places of public accommodation).
101. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (concluding that restrictions on breastfeeding do not
constitute sex discrimination, therefore statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in places of
public accommodation do not protect against such restrictions).
102. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (allowing mothers to breastfeed
their children in public).
103. See id.
104. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (stating that Title VII comparability analysis is an
appropriate framework, despite the fact that Ohio courts have not determined whether Title
VII applies to OPAS).
105. See Lawler, 322 F.3d at 903 (asserting that when a state supreme court has not ruled
on an issue, courts should follow the precedent of intermediate courts).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (obviating the necessity of the comparability analysis by
stating that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth and related conditions is per se
sex discrimination under Title VII); see also Diana Kasdan, Note, Reclaiming Title VII and
the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 309, 338 (2001) (arguing that the comparability analysis is inappropriate in
examining breastfeeding claims because it wrongly draws a distinction between pregnant
and non-pregnant persons, rather than between men and women).
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nullified, at least in examining pregnancy insurance benefits. 107
In Derungs, the court examined one Ohio Supreme Court case and a
number of Ohio intermediate court cases involving race and sex
discrimination in order to demonstrate the applicability of the
comparability analysis to OPAS. 108 The court relied on Lysyj, Gegner v.
Graham and Meyers to justify the use of comparability analysis in OPAS,
but failed to distinguish these cases from the unique issue presented in
pregnancy and breastfeeding claims. 109 Furthermore, only Meyers, a sex
discrimination case, even mentioned the need to define a comparable
class. 110
The basic test the courts used in these cases was a simple reiteration of
the plain language of the statute. 111 The Meyers decision, however, further
defined this test by using the comparability analysis. 112 In Meyers, the
court found no violation of OPAS by comparing the store’s treatment of
women to its treatment of men. 113 Although the Meyers court employed
the comparability analysis based on a linguistic interpretation of OPAS,

107. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (stating that Ohio courts use federal law in
employment claims, but admitting that Ohio courts have not settled on the use of that
framework for OPAS). The precedent of Ohio’s intermediate courts is controlling absent a
showing that the Ohio Supreme Court would have decided the issue differently; however,
the court failed to address the departure of an Ohio intermediate court in Meyers, from the
Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of the plain language interpretation of the statute in
Lysyj. Id. at 433-434.
108. See id. at 433 (implying that existing precedent from the Ohio Supreme Court and
state intermediate courts support the use of the comparability analysis in interpreting
OPAS); see also Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 5-6 (addressing race discrimination under OPAS);
Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1083-84 (considering sex discrimination under OPAS); Gegner v.
Graham, 205 N.E.2d 69, 70-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) (examining race discrimination under
OPAS).
109. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433-34 (finding that Lysyj, Meyers and Gegner support
the use of the comparability analysis and are controlling because they are the only cases to
interpret discrimination claims under OPAS); Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 5-6 (analyzing whether a
trailer park owner discriminated against a woman based on her race and stating that the test
for discrimination is whether the owner discriminated “except for reasons applicable alike”
to all); Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (considering whether the owner of a bagel shop
discriminated against a female customer when he harassed her, by comparing how the
owner treated male customers and employees to how he treated the female customer);
Gegner, 205 N.E.2d at 70-71 (employing the Lysyj test to determine whether a barbershop
owner violated OPAS by refusing to cut a black patron’s hair).
110. See Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (stating that the “thrust of the statute, by its
terms, is the comparability of treatment” and comparing the treatment of the female plaintiff
with the treatment of male customers and employees).
111. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 8 (clarifying that “the test is simply whether the proprietor
. . . denied to any person the full enjoyment of such place for reasons not applicable alike to
all persons. . . .”); Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082 (stating that “[a]ny denial of enjoyment of
services must be applicable to all persons”).
112. See Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082 (stating that OPAS’s language implies the need for
the comparability analysis).
113. See id. at 1083 (stating that the storeowner’s hostility and aggression was not
limited to females but extended to male customers and employees as well). Therefore, sex
did not motivate the owner to harass customers. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 5

688

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:3

neither Lysyj nor Meyers mentioned the federal Title VII analysis. 114 The
fact that neither case mentions Title VII analysis weakens the
persuasiveness of the Sixth Circuit’s use of the federal framework in
interpreting OPAS. 115 The Sixth Circuit adopted a framework for analysis
that neither the Ohio legislature nor Ohio courts expressly accepted and
that Congress rejected in the federal context. 116 This framework will likely
be adopted by other courts, as well, thereby failing to protect a woman’s
desire to breastfeed in public.
The Derungs court’s use of Lysyj and Gegner is particularly
unpersuasive because both cases dealt with race discrimination, not sex
discrimination, and neither case spoke of comparability analysis. 117 In
Lysyj, the court did not compare the plaintiff’s race to other residents. 118
The Derungs court interpreted this case by stating that the discrimination
was based on the fact that the owner did not prohibit the resident from
entertaining white guests, but black guests only. 119 However, the Lysyj
court did not use the comparability analysis and still found that the
woman’s race was the motivating factor in the owner’s action. 120
If the Lysyj court actually applied the comparability analysis as the
Derungs court suggested, it is possible that the outcome would have been
different. Similar to the district court’s reasoning in Derungs, the court,
using comparability analysis, might have found that the trailer park owner
did not discriminate against all white residents as compared with black
residents, but rather a subgroup of white residents who entertained black
guests. 121 Therefore, the owner did not discriminate against the resident
114. See id. at 1082 (stating that the “thrust” of OPAS, based on the terms it employs, is
comparability ); Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that the test for discrimination is a simple
reiteration of OPAS).
115. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437-38 (employing a Title VII comparability analysis and
reasoning that Ohio courts apply this analysis in deciding OPAS claims but only citing
Lysyj, Gegner and Meyers as support for this conclusion).
116. See id. at 434 (acknowledging that the use of the federal framework “has not been
definitively settled by the Ohio courts in the context of discrimination in places of public
accommodation”).
117. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that determining unlawful discrimination
requires “simply” applying the plain language of the statute); Gegner, 205 N.E.2d at 72
(reiterating the language of the statute as the test for discrimination and making no mention
of comparison other than limiting practices “for reasons applicable alike” to all).
118. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (finding that the owner discriminated against the woman
not because of her race as compared to other residents but because of her race coupled with
the race of her guests).
119. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433 (concluding that in Lysyj, the owner’s denial of
service to the woman did not occur when she entertained white guests, but only occurred
after she entertained black guests).
120. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that although the plaintiff’s race alone was not
the basis for discrimination, the owner discriminated based on the fact that a white woman
entertained black guests, thus race was a “principal motivation” for his actions).
121. See Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (holding that discrimination against a
protected subclass may be lawful). The actions are unlawful if there is evidence, through
comparison of a similar subclass, that the discrimination is in fact based on the larger class’s
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because she was a white person, but because of her specific conduct—
entertaining black guests. 122 The Lysyj court, however, did not employ the
comparability analysis, but followed a simple reading of OPAS to find that
the owner discriminated against the woman because of her race. 123
The Sixth Circuit applied the comparability analysis despite the fact that
the cases that invoke comparability analysis under OPAS are factually
distinguishable from Derungs; not one of the cases examined breastfeeding
or pregnancy as a basis of sex discrimination. 124 Although the Meyers
opinion decided a claim of discrimination based on sex, the case did not
provide an accurate basis for interpreting a claim of breastfeeding
discrimination. 125 Comparability analysis was appropriate in Meyers,
where a class of comparable men was at least plausible. 126 Using the
Meyers rationale in a breastfeeding case ignores the problem the PDA
sought to correct for pregnancy: the biological impossibility of a class of
comparable pregnant or breastfeeding men. 127 A federal Title VII analysis
requires interpretation of the PDA, rather than a comparison of women to a
class of similarly situated males. 128 By treating discrimination based on
pregnancy as a per se violation, the PDA recognizes and rectifies the
problem presented by the impossibility of finding a comparable group of
pregnant or breastfeeding men. 129
2. The Derungs Court’s Application of Employment Analysis to Ohio’s
Public Accommodation Statute Failed to Address Alternative Sources of
protected status rather than the qualification that divides the subclass from the larger
protected class. Id.
122. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that the test for discrimination is a plain reading
of the statute and making no mention of comparability or reference to a comparable class of
trailer park residents).
123. See id. (holding that the owner’s discrimination was motivated in part by the
woman’s race).
124. See, e.g., Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (examining whether verbal harassment
against a female customer constituted discrimination based on sex).
125. See id. (interpreting OPAS’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex). But see
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 27, 39-40 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) (arguing that after the PDA, Title VII
analysis in pregnancy claims will be distinct from other Title VII claims using the
comparability analysis, because discrimination based on pregnancy per se discriminates
against a woman based on of her sex and because of the biological impossibility of requiring
a comparable class or pregnant males).
126. See Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1083 (reasoning that because the storeowner also
harassed male customers and employees, his harassment of a female customer was not
motivated by her sex).
127. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2-3 (recognizing that pregnancy is confined to females
and concluding that the PDA eliminates the need of Satty’s impact approach or Gilbert’s
comparability approach, which require courts to compare the employment practice’s impact
on women to its impact on men).
128. See id. (stating that under the PDA, distinctions based on pregnancy are per se
violations of Title VII).
129. See id. (explaining that the PDA repudiates the analysis that the Supreme Court
used in Gilbert).
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Comparison
The Sixth Circuit’s use of Title VII employment analysis failed to
acknowledge the breadth of the statutory language of OPAS as compared to
Title II, the federal public accommodation antidiscrimination statute, which
applies to a limited group of protected classes. 130 The court could have
compared OPAS to Title II, because both protect against discrimination in
places of public accommodation. 131 Under this analysis, the court could
have inferred that the addition of sex as a possible source of discrimination
under OPAS, when compared to the federal Title II framework, was at least
potentially indicative of Ohio’s intent to provide broader protection for sex
discrimination than federal law. 132
Because the Derungs court employed a federal framework to OPAS, it is
useful to examine the federal public accommodation statute. 133 Under the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, separate titles govern protections from
discrimination based on status or characteristics such as race, religion, sex
or national origin in places of public accommodation and in the
employment context. 134 Title II restricts discrimination based only on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. 135 In fact, Title II federal
public accommodation protections under the Civil Rights Act do not list
sex as a prohibited basis for discriminatory treatment. 136
In contrast to the federal protections for employment discrimination and
discrimination in places of public accommodation, Ohio’s Civil Rights Act
combines both contexts and prohibits employers, labor organizations,
owners of places of public accommodation, real estate agents and
landowners from discrimination against individuals under one section of

130. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (including sex as a characteristic
basis for discrimination in places of public accommodation), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(excluding sex as a characteristic basis for discrimination in places of public
accommodation).
131. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination in places
of public accommodation), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination in places of
public accommodation).
132. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (indicating that
Minnesota, like many other states, included sex in their public accommodation statutes in
order to provide broader protections than its federal counterpart).
133. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (stating that Ohio courts use a Title VII analysis in
determining employment discrimination claims under OPAS); see also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4112.02(A)-(H) (demonstrating that unlike the federal public accommodation
statute, the Ohio legislature did not list OPAS as a separate section, but rather placed the
provision among the employment discrimination sections of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act).
134. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination in places of public
accommodation), with Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §2000e
(2000) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practice).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (excluding sex as a characteristic for public accommodation
discrimination claims).
136. See id. (prohibiting discrimination “on the ground of” race, color, religion, and
national origin).
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unlawful discriminatory practices. 137 Each of these sections lists the same
basic set of protected categories, including race, color, religion, national
origin, disability, age, ancestry and sex. 138
The Sixth Circuit could have concluded that the inclusion of sex as a
protected category in OPAS indicates the state’s intent to broaden the
federal public accommodation framework. Title II does not compel
protection against discrimination based on sex in places of public
accommodations, but states are free to prohibit such discrimination through
legislation. 139 On its face, OPAS provides a broader protection of
prohibited discriminatory acts than Title II, including discrimination based
on sex. 140 In comparison, Title VII provides a broader set of protected
groups than Title II’s protections against discrimination in places of public
accommodation, because Title VII expressly prohibits sex discrimination as
an unlawful practice. 141 OPAS similarly includes a broad class of grounds
for discrimination, including sex. 142
The Sixth Circuit accepted the district court’s conclusion that the Title
VII comparability analysis is appropriate in analyzing OPAS by
interpreting the language of the statute as implying a linguistic necessity for
comparison. 143 While most of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act adopted the classic
Title VII language “because of” or on the “basis of” sex, OPAS uses the
phrase “for reasons applicable alike regardless of” sex. 144 The Derungs
137. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 4112.02(A)-(H) (prohibiting various discriminatory
employment practices, discriminatory housing practices and discrimination in places of
public accommodation).
138. See id. §§ 4112.02(A)-(C), (E)-(G) (listing the same group of protected
characteristics as race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age and ancestry). But
see id. § 4112.02(D) (omitting age from the list of characteristics); id. § 4112.02(H) (naming
the same group of characteristics and adding familial status).
139. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624-25 (upholding Minnesota’s Public
Accommodation statute, which includes sex, although the addition broadened the scope of
protection provided by Title II).
140. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. at § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination
“except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, disability, age or ancestry”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (extending protection
only to discrimination “on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin”).
141. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination “on the ground of race,
color, religion or national origin”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting discriminatory
practice “because of” sex, race, color, religion or national origin).
142. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination, regardless of
sex, in places of public accommodation “except for reasons applicable alike”).
143. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437 (stating that the statute’s use of the language “reasons
applicable alike” compels a comparison between groups to establish discrimination);
Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 891-92 (concluding that there is no reason to distinguish
between the analysis necessary to determine discrimination based on sex under OPAS and
discrimination based on sex under the Title VII analysis). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.02(A) (stating that employers may not discriminate “because of . . . sex,” thus
invoking Title VII analysis as defined by the PDA); cf. id. § 4112.02(G) (using the language
“reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless” of sex and failing to incorporate Title
VII’s language).
144. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (adopting the language of the PDA
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court acknowledged the difference in language between OPAS and the rest
of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, stating that the linguistic difference
strengthened the logic behind applying Title VII comparability analysis. 145
However, the Derungs court could have concluded that the language
indicates intent to use a distinct analysis, rather than employing Title VII’s
basic framework.
3. The Derungs Court Followed an Overruled and Flawed Federal
Framework
The Supreme Court accepted the PDA’s assertion that pregnancy
discrimination is discrimination per se and affirmed the inapplicability of
comparability analysis for claims of discrimination based on pregnancy.
However, federal courts have been unwilling to extend the PDA’s logic to
include breastfeeding discrimination, like pregnancy discrimination, in the
definition of discrimination based on sex. 146 Instead, the federal courts that
have examined these claims have resurrected the Gilbert analysis and
found that practices that fail to protect breastfeeding do not discriminate
Derungs followed this flawed framework for
based on sex. 147
breastfeeding discrimination, and other courts may as well, in states that
currently lack protection for breastfeeding women. 148
In an employment context, discrimination or distinctions based on
pregnancy form a basis for a valid sex discrimination claim. 149 However,
lower courts have not extended this reasoning to prohibit employment
discrimination based on a woman’s breastfeeding. 150 Consequently, the
and prohibiting employers from discriminating based on sex), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(defining the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” for employment
discrimination purposes), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting
discrimination in places of public accommodation).
145. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437 (reasoning that the distinct language used in OPAS,
as compared with the other provisions of the Civil Rights law, implies a need for the
comparability analysis to find a violation).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (redefining the terms “because of” or “on the basis of”
sex to include pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions); see also Newport News,
462 U.S. at 678 (holding that distinctions based on pregnancy constitute sex discrimination
under the PDA). But see, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (holding that breastfeeding discrimination claims are not valid bases for sex
discrimination under Title VII).
147. See, e.g., Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 867, 869 (reasoning that a distinction drawn at
breastfeeding is not a distinction drawn at sex). But cf. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (asserting
that the PDA’s broad language clearly extends protection to “the whole range of matters
concerning the childbearing process”).
148. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 (following federal cases, which resurrected the prePDA Gilbert analysis as the standard for breastfeeding discrimination claims); see also
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalites For Pregnancy,
Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 381 (1999) (stating that continuing to
use Gilbert logic ignores Congress’s intent to overrule Gilbert’s holding and reasoning).
149. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678-82 (explaining that, as a result of the PDA,
Title VII protects pregnant women from sex discrimination in an employment context).
150. See, e.g., Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (holding that Title VII does not include
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Sixth Circuit in Derungs was unwilling to conclude that OPAS intended to
prohibit restrictions on breastfeeding simply by prohibiting sex
discrimination. 151 Lower courts resurrected the Gilbert comparability
analysis in examining breastfeeding discrimination claims, 152 despite the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the PDA overruled Gilbert’s holding. 153
While the Court in Newport News held that the specific challenged
practice constituted discrimination based on sex, it did not expressly define
the scope of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. 154 This judicial
oversight led most federal courts to conclude that limitations on public
breastfeeding and an employer’s lack of accommodation for breastfeeding
are not forms of sex-based discrimination under Title VII. 155 Specifically,
the Fourth Circuit led this trend of ignoring the PDA in assessing the
claims of breastfeeding discrimination in Barrash v. Bowen. 156
In Barrash, an employer denied a female employee’s request for six
months unpaid leave in order to breastfeed her child. 157 The Fourth Circuit
failed to embrace the breadth of the PDA’s language and extend the logic
to distinctions based on breastfeeding. 158 Instead, the court held that the
PDA did not cover discrimination based on breastfeeding. 159
Consequently, the unwillingness of the court to extend the logic of the PDA
breastfeeding as a basis for sex discrimination).
151. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 429 (holding that OPAS’s prohibition of sex
discrimination does not include breastfeeding discrimination).
152. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (expressly invoking Gilbert as the
appropriate analysis); see also Kasdan, supra note 106, at 337-38 (arguing that courts have
no rational basis for excluding breastfeeding from pregnancy discrimination claims as a
bright line rule, given broad scope of the PDA,).
153. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676 (expressly overruling the holding and reasoning
of Gilbert).
154. See id. at 678 (holding only that the specific insurance plan, which did not give
equal pregnancy benefits to the spouses of male employees as it did to female employees,
constituted discrimination).
155. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869-70 (holding that breastfeeding is not a medical
condition related to pregnancy and, therefore, not a form of pregnancy or sex discrimination
under the PDA); see also Kasdan, supra note 106, at 309-13, 324 (arguing that courts drew
a distinction between sex-based discrimination and discrimination based on breastfeeding
and applied the logic of Gilbert, rather than the intent of the PDA, to exclude breastfeeding
from Title VII protection); Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 377 (asserting that the
courts denied extending the PDA to breastfeeding by comparing “gender specific
breastfeeding to sex neutral childrearing . . . .”).
156. See 846 F.2d at 928 (considering whether the Social Security Administration
discriminated against an employee because of her sex in denying her request for six months
maternity leave without pay so that she could breastfeed her child).
157. See id. (noting that an employer granted an employee a six-month leave for the birth
of her first child, but after the employer changed policies regarding pay without leave, the
employer denied the same employee another six-month leave for her second child).
158. See Kasdan, supra note 106, at 338-40 (arguing that courts should recognize
breastfeeding as a possible source of sex discrimination under the intended broad scope of
the PDA to ensure that employers do not discriminate against women).
159. See Barrash, 846 F.2d at 931 (stating that the PDA only covered “incapacitating”
conditions).
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to claims of breastfeeding paved the road for two district courts to resurrect
the logic of Gilbert in analyzing claims of breastfeeding discrimination. 160
Following a trend of relying on overruled logic, a Kentucky district court
cited and followed the Gilbert analysis in examining a claim of
breastfeeding discrimination in Wallace v. Pyro Mining. 161 In Wallace, an
employee alleged that her employer’s denial of permission for personal
leave so that she could wean her child from breastfeeding violated the
PDA. 162 First, the court examined the claim under a Gilbert analysis, yet
interestingly linked breastfeeding to pregnancy, giving false hope that the
court might recognize the need to analyze breastfeeding under the PDA. 163
The court even acknowledged the impact of the PDA on pregnancy claims,
but then narrowly interpreted the PDA by confining the analysis to
breastfeeding as a medical condition. 164 Citing Barrash’s requirement of
incapacitation, the court dismissed the claim that breastfeeding was a type
of medical condition protected by the PDA. 165
In Martinez v. NBC, the court neglected to reference the PDA at all. 166
Instead, the court focused on the Gilbert analysis and held that the
employer did not treat the plaintiff any differently than a “similarly
situated” man. 167 While the PDA does not expressly mention breastfeeding
as a protected act, the court’s reasoning is unpersuasive because it fails to
recognize that this comparability analysis, at least in terms of analyzing
pregnancy, is exactly the sex discrimination analysis the PDA abolished. 168
These lower court cases establish a framework for analysis of
breastfeeding discrimination claims that ignores the logic of the PDA. 169
160. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (citing Gilbert as controlling precedent); accord
Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (stating that Gilbert established the basic framework for
discrimination claims under Title VII and holding that treating breastfeeding women
differently is not prohibited under the Gilbert analysis).
161. See 789 F. Supp. at 868-69 (holding that an employer’s refusal of an additional
leave of absence so that an employee could breastfeed her child did not constitute sex
discrimination). The court invoked Gilbert’s conclusion that if the plan did not confer
pregnancy benefits on either sex, it automatically treated men and women equally. Id.
162. See id. at 868 (stating that the plaintiff requested an additional six weeks of personal
leave because her child rejected all forms of food but breast milk).
163. See id. at 869 (acknowledging that, like pregnancy, only women can breastfeed, and
breastfeeding is naturally and necessarily linked to pregnancy).
164. See id. (stating that the PDA protects medical conditions related to pregnancy, but
nevertheless does not define these conditions).
165. See id. at 870 (stating that under Barrash, the PDA protects only incapacitating
medical conditions related to pregnancy).
166. See 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309-11 (holding that NBC’s failure to provide one of its
female employees with an adequately safe and private area to pump breast milk was not
discrimination based on sex under Title VII).
167. See id. at 309, 311 (stating that breastfeeding, unlike pregnancy, is not a protected
basis for sex discrimination under the PDA, so the Gilbert analysis applies).
168. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3-4 (stating that the PDA considers pregnancy
discrimination a per se violation of Title VII by treating distinctions based on pregnancy the
same as other sex-based distinctions).
169. Compare Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (distinguishing breastfeeding as a medical
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The cases applied the analysis of a case that the Supreme Court has
Their application to OPAS is therefore
specifically overruled. 170
unpersuasive and illogical. 171
Additionally, these cases ignore the plain language of the PDA by
disregarding the “not limited to” clause. 172 This clause is a strong
indication that Congress intended the PDA to provide broad protections
against various practices surrounding pregnancy, not limiting protection to
the confined state of pregnancy and act of childbirth. 173 Had Congress
intended to limit the statute specifically to pregnancy, childbirth, and
related medical conditions, arguably Congress would have omitted the “not
limited to” clause. 174 Ignoring the plain language of the statute not only
misinterprets the statute itself, but also ignores the underlying intent of the
statute: protecting women against various forms of discrimination in the
workplace. 175 As long as courts continue to narrowly interpret sex
discrimination claims and exclude breastfeeding from protection under the
PDA, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned in Derungs, states must expressly enact
express legislation to adequately protect public breastfeeding.
C. Breastfeeding is a Sex-Specific Act and the Derungs Holding
Discriminates against Women
1. The Derungs Court Made Implausible Sex-Neutral Comparisons
Through its use of the comparability analysis, the court in Derungs not

condition and asserting that since it is not an incapacitating condition, analysis under the
PDA was inappropriate), with H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 4 (stating that “pregnancy-based
distinctions will be subject to the same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex
discrimination proscribed in the existing statute”), and id. at 5 (stating that the statute is
deliberately broad to include all stages of the childbearing process).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining the terms involving sex discrimination to
include pregnancy); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676, 678 (arguing that Congress, through
the PDA, overturned the specific holding in Gilbert).
171. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 (following federal cases, which use a Gilbert
analysis, as the standard for breastfeeding discrimination claims); Newport News, 462 U.S.
at 676, 678 (holding that the PDA overturned the holding and reasoning of Gilbert).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” by
stating that the terms “include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”).
173. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 377 (asserting that no court has
interpreted the “not limited to” clause of the PDA).
174. See id. at 382 (arguing that courts have concluded that breastfeeding is not
“pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to pregnancy” and ignored the “plain
language” of the PDA, which states that discrimination may not be limited to these factors);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 7 (stating intended exclusions of certain applications of
the PDA, but not expressly excluding breastfeeding). The House Report specifically
addressed the concern that potential plaintiffs would use the PDA to force employers to pay
for abortions and stated that the statute expressly limits this application. Id.
175. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (stating that the PDA’s broad use of language makes
it clear that the statute intended to extend to a range of issues concerning pregnancy and
childbearing).
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only ignored the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the PDA
overruled Gilbert in Newport News, but also ignored the fact that
breastfeeding is biologically a sex-specific act. 176 While states may protect
public breastfeeding by enacting legislation like Ohio’s new law, decisions
like the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Derungs are important for states to note
so that they may design legislation that does not rely on traditional sex
discrimination frameworks for protection of breastfeeding. 177 The court’s
analysis requires a comparison of treatment to a subclass of men that
cannot biologically exist. 178 This analysis not only relies on overruled
rationale and logic as discussed earlier, but fails to recognize the sexspecific nature of pregnancy and extend that logic to the similarly sexspecific act of breastfeeding. 179 The court cited Barrash, Martinez and
Wallace as examples of other instances where comparability analysis was
appropriate in breastfeeding claims. 180 The court dismissed a claim of sexplus discrimination for lacking a comparable subclass of men, rather than
explain the inapplicability of sex-plus discrimination claims to
breastfeeding discrimination. 181 These conclusions fail to acknowledge the
unique issue presented by the sex-specific nature of breastfeeding, similar
to pregnancy, and its impact on women in the workplace. 182
Using a sex-neutral comparability analysis in breastfeeding, as in
pregnancy employment cases, for example, could potentially allow
employers to discriminate based on a characteristic that only women
possess as a pretext for discrimination based on their sex. 183 Congress and
176. See Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 485-86 (2001) (asserting that ignoring the sex-specific nature
of breastfeeding results in inequality of the treatment of men and women in the workplace).
177. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437 (holding that OPAS, which prohibits sex
discrimination, does not protect against discrimination against breastfeeding women).
178. See id. (requiring a comparison between the manner in which Wal-Mart treated
breastfeeding women and the manner in which it treated men).
179. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 377-80 (comparing sex-specific
breastfeeding to sex-specific pregnancy); see also Kay, supra note 125, at 39-40 (asserting
that cases like Geduldig, which do not recognize the biological and reproductive differences
between men and women, perpetuate inequality between the sexes).
180. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438-39 (stating that other breastfeeding cases have
“universally accepted” the use of the comparability analysis and citing Wallace, Martinez
and Barrash as examples of controlling precedent).
181. See id. at 439 (stating that a sex-plus claim fails for lack of a comparable subclass
of men); see also Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (holding that an employer’s refusal to
hire women with pre-school age children but not similarly-situated men violated Title VII as
sex discrimination even though the characteristic that served as the distinction, having preschool age children, was sex-neutral); see also Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the
Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 124 (2003) (arguing that the sex-plus analysis that the Supreme
Court established in Martin Marietta required a sex-neutral characteristic as the “plus”
factor).
182. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 355 (asserting that breastfeeding, like
pregnancy, is exclusive to women and influences their function as employees and decision
to work).
183. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (finding that “tasteless and offensive”
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the Supreme Court eradicated this problem for pregnancy, at least in the
employment context, through the PDA. 184 This logic extends naturally to
breastfeeding because, like pregnancy, breastfeeding is sex-specific to
women. 185 For these reasons, the Derungs court applied a faulty and
outdated logic in using a Title VII analysis. 186
The Derungs court also misinterpreted the applicability of sex-plus
discrimination in analyzing breastfeeding discrimination claims by
essentially using the same test it would apply in any sex discrimination
claim and requiring a comparable class of men. 187 The court ignored the
fact that sex-plus claims are inapplicable because these claims deal with a
distinction based on sex coupled with a sex-neutral characteristic, which
serves as a pretext for the underlying sex discrimination. 188 However,
breastfeeding is not a sex-neutral characteristic, like parenting a schoolaged child. 189 Therefore, the reasoning the court followed in dismissing the
claim because of the lack of a comparable subclass ignored the underlying
problem of applying traditional Title VII analysis to pregnancy and
breastfeeding claims. 190 The Derungs court’s comparison of the plaintiff’s
claim to the Martinez sex-plus analysis does not fail because of the lack of
a comparable class, but is completely inappropriate in its application
because the “plus” characteristic is sex-specific rather than sex-neutral. 191
remarks directed towards an employee pumping breast milk did not constitute sex
discrimination).
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of
sex” to include pregnancy); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (stating the PDA necessitates a
finding that distinctions based on pregnancy equal distinctions based on sex and, therefore,
violate Title VII).
185. See Christrup, supra note 176, at 485-86 (arguing that the reasoning courts employ
to find that distinctions based on breastfeeding do not amount to discrimination against
women, like distinctions based on pregnancy, ignores the sex-specific nature of
breastfeeding).
186. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 381 (asserting that because Congress
overruled the Gilbert logic, it did not intend for courts to revive the logic in similar cases).
187. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438-39 (comparing the plaintiff’s claim to the
breastfeeding sex-plus claim asserted in Martinez and concluding that sex-plus analysis
would still require a corresponding subclass of similarly situated men).
188. See Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (holding that an employer’s practice of
refusing to hire women with preschool-age children was discriminatory because no similar
sex-neutral hiring requirement existed for men who had preschool-age children); see also
Williams & Segal, supra note 181, at 124 (asserting that sex-plus discrimination occurs
when an employer treats an employee differently because of sex, in addition to some neutral
characteristic).
189. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 380 (asserting that breastfeeding is not
sex-neutral, like childrearing, but rather stems from biological and reproductive differences
between men and women).
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2-3 (recognizing that the PDA obviates the need for
comparison between men and women based on recognition that pregnancy is confined to
women).
191. See Williams & Segal, supra note 181, at 124-27 (citing a number of cases that
correctly use sex-plus discrimination claims where the “plus” characteristic is sex-neutral,
such as parenting children). Compare Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (classifying the choice to
breastfeed as a “plus” characteristic), with Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (classifying
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The court should have ignored the traditional analysis and, instead, have
embraced and extended the logic of the PDA to breastfeeding. 192
2. Treating Breastfeeding as a Choice Ignores Its Sex-Specific Nature
The difficulty many courts face in translating traditional sex
discrimination analysis to pregnancy and breastfeeding discrimination
arises from the fact that not all women will become pregnant or
breastfeed. 193 In this way, the distinction the courts often draw is that
breastfeeding is not directly the result of being a woman, but rather a
choice a woman makes. 194 Courts find this problem even more critical in
breastfeeding claims as they view a more attenuated link between sex and
the act of breastfeeding. 195 The subgroups become smaller, resulting in a
group of women who can or will become pregnant, and an even smaller
subset of those women, namely those who choose or will be able to
breastfeed. 196 The Derungs court found this division exceptionally
compelling. 197
In pregnancy or breastfeeding discrimination claims, the characteristic
that makes women different is their status as pregnant or breastfeeding
women, which is not mentioned anywhere in the pre-PDA version of Title
VII. 198 As a result, the PDA effectively redefined sex to include a
subgroup of distinctions or classes based on sex. 199 Arguably, courts could
apply the new definition of sex to include pregnancy as a distinction based
on sex, making comparability analysis workable in pregnancy
discrimination claims. 200 However, this interpretation does not provide a
parenting a school-age child as the “plus” characteristic).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (stating that discrimination “based on sex” or “because of
sex” includes discrimination because of pregnancy); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3-4 (stating
that discrimination based on pregnancy is per se sex discrimination under Title VII).
193. See, e.g., Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (stating that Wal-Mart’s breastfeeding
restriction affects only women who choose to breastfeed).
194. See Barrash, 846 F.2d. at 931-32 (stating that breastfeeding is not an incapacitating
medical condition but rather results from a mother’s wish to nurse her child).
195. See Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (defining the groups resulting from WalMart’s restriction on breastfeeding as (1) women who breastfeed and their infants, and (2)
individuals who do not breastfeed or are not breastfed).
196. See id. at 893 (stating that Wal-Mart may discriminate against the protected
subclass of women who choose to breastfeed, unless the women can prove Wal-Mart's
discrimination by comparing themselves to a comparable subclass of men).
197. See id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the court’s analysis should not require a
plaintiff to show that the employer’s practice discriminated against all women, but rather
that the employer’s practice discriminated against some women who wished to engage in
breastfeeding, because such an assertion “misses the point”).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining distinctions “based on sex” to include
pregnancy).
200. See Kay, supra note 125, at 30 (asserting that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Gilbert
provides a possible, although not sufficient, solution to the lack of a comparable class of
men by dividing the classes resulting from distinctions based on sex as persons who face the
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solid basis for claims of breastfeeding discrimination because it lays a
foundation for courts to treat breastfeeding and pregnancy as a choice that a
subclass of women willingly make, rather than equating pregnancy with
sex. 201
However, the PDA does not require the comparability analysis, since
distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII. 202
Instead, the PDA simply extends the definition of sex to include
pregnancy. 203 In this way, the PDA rejects the use of comparability
analysis and provides a framework that meets the goal of ensuring
protection of women in the workplace, even if pregnancy is a choice. 204
This per se approach is the framework that Congress intended and that the
Supreme Court supported. 205 Considering the broad nature of the PDA, the
logic behind distinguishing pregnancy per se violations of Title VII, despite
the lack of comparability analysis, and the sex-specific nature of
breastfeeding, courts have incorrectly withheld the extension of the PDA to
breastfeeding discrimination claims. 206 Finally, the courts erroneously
related breastfeeding to “child-care” rather than relating breastfeeding to
pregnancy, further foreclosing the possibility of including protection for
breastfeeding under the PDA. 207
3. Treating Breastfeeding as a Medical Condition Ignores Its Sex-Specific
Nature
Courts avoided the issue of breastfeeding as sex-specific in cases like
Barrash and Wallace, by confining their analyses to the “related medical
condition” clause and treating breastfeeding as a trivial medical condition
risk of pregnancy and those who do not).
201. See Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 38 BUS. L.J. 819, 850 (2001) (arguing that treating pregnancy as a
subclass and choice, rather than equating it with sex, results in the courts giving less
deference to pregnancy than to “immutable” traits like race and sex).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining “because of sex” and “based on sex” to include
pregnancy); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3-4 (clarifying that pregnancy discrimination is a per
se violation of Title VII, under the PDA).
203. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (stating that Congress enacted the PDA “to change
the definition of sex discrimination”).
204. See id. (noting that the PDA ensures “working women are protected against all
forms of employment discrimination based on sex”).
205. See id. (explaining that “distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of
Title VII”); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (stating that the PDA clearly requires courts to
find that discrimination based on pregnancy is “on its face” discrimination based on sex).
206. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 392 (asserting that, like pregnancy,
breastfeeding is a biological function that courts should recognize).
207. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869, 879 (citing to the PDA's legislative history in
examining Congress’s intent to exclude child care from the protection of the PDA, thereby
relating breastfeeding to childrearing rather than relating breastfeeding to pregnancy); see
also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 380 (stating that unlike childrearing,
breastfeeding is not sex-neutral, and that making such comparisons ignores the biological
differences between men and women).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

31

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 5

700

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:3

related to pregnancy. 208 These court decisions erroneously defined
Furthermore, in treating
breastfeeding as a medical condition. 209
breastfeeding as a medical condition, the Barrash incapacitation
requirement wrongly interpreted the PDA narrowly, ignoring the possibility
that Congress intended more breadth in enacting the Act. 210 The more
courts continue to follow these flawed frameworks, express legislation
protecting breastfeeding is imperative.
D. Implications and Recommendations
1. The Medical and Social Benefits of Breastfeeding Augment the
Importance of Legal Protection of Public Breastfeeding
The protection of public breastfeeding in Ohio and other states is critical
due to the numerous benefits breastfeeding provides infants, 211 mothers 212
Breastfeeding also promotes family values. 214
In
and society. 213
recognition of the importance of breastfeeding to families and society, the
World Health Organization (“WHO”) advocates the adoption of a global
public health policy recommending that mothers feed infants exclusively
through breastfeeding for the first six months of infancy. 215 The legal
208. See Barrash, 846 F.2d at 931-32 (stating that, to justify discrimination based on sex,
one would need to compare women and men; however, there is no valid comparison
between men suffering an incapacitating medical condition and “young mothers wishing to
nurse little babies”); Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (stating that the PDA protects medical
conditions, but finding that breastfeeding is not the type of medical condition that the PDA
covers).
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining “sex” as including, but not limited to,
pregnancy); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (extending the PDA’s protection to include all
matters pertaining to the childbearing process). But see Isabelle Schallreuter Olson,
Casenote and Comment, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No Mother’s Milk for U.S. Children,
The Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 269, 302 (1995) (arguing that because of
the health benefits of breastfeeding and because of the courts characterization of
breastfeeding as “child rearing,” it is appropriate for courts to analyze breastfeeding as a
medical condition related to pregnancy under the PDA).
210. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (explaining that the PDA covers a range of matters
concerning pregnancy and related medical conditions, but does not require incapacitation).
211. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 19, at 10-11 (enumerating child health benefits of
breastfeeding, such as resistance to infectious disease and developmental benefits).
212. See id. at 11 (including physical benefits of breastfeeding to the mother such as
minimizing postpartum maternal blood loss, reducing the risk of menopausal breast and
ovarian cancers and psychological benefits such as increased self-confidence).
213. See id. (noting socioeconomic benefits including a decrease in medical expenditures
for families and employers and higher employee productivity due to a decrease in parental
absence from the workplace). Breastfeeding decreases such parental absence from the
workplace because breastfed babies generally are sick less often than non-breastfed babies.
Id.
214. See Gordon G. Waggett & Rega Richardson Waggett, Breast is Best: Legis.
Supporting Breast-Feeding is an Absolute Bare Necessity-A Model Approach, 6 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71, 77 (1994-1995) (suggesting that the nurturing nature of
breastfeeding provides a strong foundation for a child and promotes a natural bond between
mother and child).
215. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR INFANT & YOUNG CHILD
FEEDING 7 (2003) (reasoning that because breastfeeding is the best way to promote healthy
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protection of public breastfeeding is important because studies show that
requiring women to hide or disguise breastfeeding, discouraging women
from breastfeeding at work, and placing other bans or restrictions on public
breastfeeding discourages women from choosing to breastfeed their
children, despite the practice’s physical, psychological and socioeconomic
value. 216
2. Social Implications of Lack of Legal Protection for Public Breastfeeding
Currently, at least thirty-six states have some legislation related to
breastfeeding and at least twenty-three states expressly protect public
breastfeeding. 217 The states that protect public breastfeeding are in line
with federal policy promoting breastfeeding as the healthiest and most
desirable form of nutrition for infants. 218 Many of these states meet the
Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People 2010 objective
of a seventy-five percent rate of mothers breastfeeding their infants. 219
However, Ohio is well below the seventy-five percent objective. 220 It is
quite likely that Ohio’s history of failing to meet the national objective, like
other states failing to meet the objective, stems from the state’s history of
lack of legal protection for public breastfeeding. 221 When states do not
protect public breastfeeding, women face discrimination in places of public
accommodation, embarrassment, low esteem in body image and general
lack of acceptance. 222 These factors weigh heavily on a woman’s decision
growth and development, governments should ensure that communities and workplaces
support and accommodate breastfeeding women).
216. See, e.g., IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that only 64.5% of Ohio
mothers breastfed their children at any point during infancy). But see Danielle M. Shelton,
When Private Goes Public: Legal Protection for Women who Breastfeed in Public and at
Work, 14 LAW & INEQ. 179, 183 (1995) (noting Norwegian law, which requires employers
to allow breastfeeding mothers two hours a day to breastfeed, as an example of policy that
positively impacts breastfeeding rates and results in ninety-nine percent of mothers
breastfeeding their infants for more than six weeks of infancy).
217. See STATE LEGIS., supra note 99 (providing examples of state laws that relate to
breastfeeding); NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., 50 STATES SUMMARY OF BREASTFEEDING
LAWS (Sept. 2004) (listing the various state laws protecting or promoting breastfeeding), at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/breast50.htm (last visited July 24, 2005).
218. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1790 (2000) (recognizing breastfeeding as the best method of
ensuring infant nutrition and implementing a national breastfeeding promotion program).
219. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (2005) (protecting a mother’s right to breastfeed
in any place of public accommodation); IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting
that 83.7 percent of California mothers have breastfed their infants).
220. See IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that 64.5 percent of Ohio
mothers breastfed their infants at any time during infancy).
221. See Waggett & Waggett, supra note 214, at 77-78, 81 (arguing that societal
attitudes about breastfeeding influence a woman’s decision to breastfeed her child and that
legislation allowing breastfeeding in public is necessary to change society’s negative
attitudes and encourage mothers to breastfeed their children).
222. See, e.g., Derungs, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (stating that Ms. Derungs was “appalled”
and “embarrassed” when a Wal-Mart employee told her that she had to move to the
restroom or leave the store while breastfeeding her child because she might offend other
customers).
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to breastfeed in public, as well as on her decision to breastfeed at all. 223
Additionally, ignoring the sex-specific nature of breastfeeding adopts a
rigid, formal vision of equality between men and women. 224 A substantive
approach of equality that recognizes the biological differences between
men and women would promote equality between men and women in the
workplace more adequately, thus fulfilling one of the primary goals of the
PDA. 225
3. Recommendations for Action by Other States
Because OPAS prohibits sex discrimination but does not expressly
include protection for breastfeeding discrimination, Ohio’s new law was a
proper legislative response that will better protect women from
breastfeeding discrimination in places of public accommodation. 226 Over
nineteen state agencies and organizations went on the record to Senator
Clancy’s breastfeeding bill, demonstrating the widespread support for
protecting public breastfeeding. 227 States that do not enact similar
legislation will not protect women who breastfeed in public against
discrimination. The lack of willingness of the courts to extend the
protection of the PDA to breastfeeding results in the fact that states like
Ohio that protect sex discrimination based on a Title VII model, whether in
employment or public accommodation statutes, are not protecting against
breastfeeding discrimination. 228 Instead, they must adopt alternative
legislation expressly protecting public breastfeeding. 229 Similarly, outdated
criminal statutes that criminalize exposure of the female breast provide
potential barriers to public breastfeeding that states should note in
223. See Waggett & Waggett, supra note 214, at 81 (arguing that a woman needs to be
able to breastfeed her child at any time and in any place in order to be successful at
breastfeeding).
224. See Christrup, supra note 176, at 485-86 (stating that ignoring the sex-specific
nature of an activity like giving birth or breastfeeding ignores actual differences between
men and women and that ignoring these differences makes it impossible to consider men
and women equally).
225. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (noting the primary goal of the PDA is to ensure that
women are free from sex discrimination in the workplace); see also Katharine T. Bartlett,
Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4-5 (1994) (noting that a substantive equality
approach, which looks to the results or effects of a law or practice and accounts for
biological differences, makes up for the effect of a formal equality approach that ignores
these differences and results in inequality between men and women).
226. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (Ohio 2005) (requiring that
proprietors of places of public accommodation allow women to breastfeed).
227. See E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio Senate, to
Brianne Whelan (Jan. 28, 2005, 13:37 EST) (on file with author) (listing a number of
supporters of the bill, such as the Ohio Academy of Family Physicians and the Ohio
Department of Health, as well as the Executive Director of the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission, G. Michael Payton).
228. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that restrictions on breastfeeding in
places of public accommodation do not constitute sex discrimination under OPAS).
229. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (Ohio 2005) (permitting mothers to
breastfeed in public).
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considering new legislation. 230

230. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (examining several state criminal
statutes involving exposure of the female breast).
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In February 2003, Senator Olympia J. Snowe introduced a proposal in
the United States Senate to amend the PDA to include breastfeeding under
the definition of discrimination based on sex, but the bill never emerged
from consideration. 231 Until Congress adopts legislation like this, or the
Supreme Court rules on whether Congress intended the PDA to protect
against discrimination based on breastfeeding, courts may continue to
resurrect the logic of Gilbert and the PDA will not protect the act of
breastfeeding. 232 Therefore, more states should follow Ohio and adopt
legislation expressly protecting public breastfeeding.
CONCLUSION
Derungs exemplifies the inadequacy of protection for public
breastfeeding in states lacking specific legislation protecting the practice. 233
Courts are reluctant to rule that breastfeeding discrimination amounts to
sex discrimination under an employment discrimination analysis. 234 This
analysis employs a rigid formal approach to sex discrimination and equality
issues. 235 Furthermore, the analysis is inconsistent with the PDA’s goal of
protecting women from discrimination in the workplace and federal
policies promoting breastfeeding as the healthiest source of nutrition for
infants. 236 Unless courts abandon the use of the overruled Gilbert analysis,
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination in the employment context or in
places of public accommodation will not protect public breastfeeding
adequately. 237 While Ohio’s law may not completely nullify the Derungs
holding, 238 more states should adopt similar legislation because it will
231. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001, S. 418, 108th Cong.
(2003) (proposing to include the term “breastfeeding” after the term “childbirth” in the
PDA). The Senate assigned the bill to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions on February 14, 2003. Id.
232. See, e.g., Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (holding that excluding breastfeeding from
situations in which employers will grant employees personal leave is not sex discrimination
“under the principles set forth in Gilbert”).
233. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that OPAS does not prohibit places of public
accommodation from restricting or banning public breastfeeding).
234. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309-11 (holding that an employer’s inability
to provide privacy for, and prevent the harassment of, a female employee’s breast pumping
did not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII because the PDA does not cover
breastfeeding as a basis, per se, for sex discrimination).
235. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (describing the different effects of
employing a substantive equality approach rather than a formal equality approach on
breastfeeding claims).
236. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (acknowledging the primary goal of the PDA as the
protection of women from all forms of workplace discrimination); H.R. REP. NO. 102-645,
at 4 (recognizing the importance of federal promotion of breastfeeding because of the
numerous health benefits breastfeeding provides).
237. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that places of public accommodation
may ban breastfeeding because such restrictions do not constitute sex discrimination).
238. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (providing an affirmative
right to breastfeed), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (West 2005) (providing a
private right of action for sex discrimination claims).
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better protect women who breastfeed and will result in consistency with the
federal and state promotion of breastfeeding. 239

239. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3781.55 (West 2005) (proposing to amend Ohio law to
require places of public accommodation to allow public breastfeeding); Waggett & Waggett,
supra note 214, at 81-83 (arguing that legislation allowing women to breastfeed in public is
necessary to overcome the pervasiveness of society's negative attitudes towards
breastfeeding that create barriers to a woman’s ability to breastfeed her child any time or
place).
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